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BOOK
REVIEWS
THE STATE OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES
LITERATURE
Leigh Raymond* on Sovereignty Without Property? Recent Books in
Public Lands Scholarship
Books reviewed in this essay:
Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford. Democracy in Practice:Public
Participationin Environmental Decisions (Resources for the Future Press
2002)
Daniel Kemmis, This Sovereign Land: A New Visionfor Governing the West
(Island Press 2002)
Karen R. Merrill. Public Lands and PoliticalMeaning: Ranchers, the
Government, and the Property Between Them (California 2002)
Eric W. Mogren. Warm Sands: Uranium Mill Tailings Policy in the Atomic
West (University of New Mexico 2002)
Thomas Michael Power & Richard N. Barrett. Post-Cowboy Economics: Pay
and Prosperity in the New American West (Island Press 2001)
Should local people be given the authority to solve their own
environmental problems? Or are national and even international
institutions of power essential for sound resource management and
ecological protection? This tug of war between local and national control
is a long-standing struggle in U.S. environmental policy, dating at least
back to the Progressive Era. In recent years, however, locals have been
pulling harder. From watershed initiatives to Resource Advisory
Councils, collaborative groups of public land users are asserting more
influence over the management of the federal estate. While the
experiences of these groups have been a mixed bag to date, the
movement toward greater local control is unmistakable.
Of course, participants in the ongoing struggle over public lands
policy are of two minds regarding this trend, with some celebrating the
emergence of a new, more direct form of democracy and others decrying
* B.A. Yale University (1988); M.S. University of California, Berkeley (1996); Ph.D.
University of California, Berkeley (2000); Assistant Professor of Political Science, Purdue
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the loss of national sovereignty over land belonging to all citizens of the
United States. Within this conflict, one of the more reasonable voices
supporting a radical change towards localism has been that of Daniel
Kemmis. A former Montana State Legislator and Mayor of Missoula,
Kemmis has thoughtfully argued for greater community influence over
public policy for more than a decade. His 1990 book Community and the
Politics of Place was an early exposition of the advantages of local
governance that anticipated (and perhaps to some extent even inspired)
the rapid development of watershed councils and other local
collaboration groups in the 1990s. Now, more than ten years later,
Kemmis has written another book on the same subject, This Sovereign
Land. Both more provocative and more pragmatic than his earlier text,
This Sovereign Land explicitly advocates the devolution of much of the
federal estate to the authority of local, watershed-based councils
representing diverse western interests. While not a detailed policy
proposal, the book does lay out a number of arguments in favor of
devolution, as well as dedicating a chapter to exploring what such a
locally-oriented system of public land management might look like.
In the polarized world of public land policy, such a proposal
could easily be dismissed as another Wise Use attempt to seize public
resources for private gain. Indeed, given their resistance to existing
collaboration efforts, it is hard to imagine environmentalists lining up for
autographed copies at a Kemmis book-reading (despite the volume's
publication by the green-friendly Island Press). Nor is it easy to imagine
the federal government voluntarily ceding control of most of the land it
currently owns in the West, even in the current Republican era of tax
cuts and smaller government. Many public lands users who might be
expected to support a large-scale devolution proposal have displayed a
decided reluctance to change existing tenure arrangements that, despite
repeated protestations and complaints, in many ways seem to serve
them quite well. Given the unhappy fact that no one, therefore, is likely
to agree with it, one might wonder whether Kemmis's book matters at
all.
In fact, this essay argues that his book matters a great deal. The
reason why is found in Kemmis's own refreshingly candid statement of
purpose. This Sovereign Land does not offer a fixed and dogmatic agenda
for changing public land governance. Rather, its stated purpose is "to
invite discussion and debate about the shifts in sovereignty over western
public lands that Americans have ever greater reason to expect in the
coming decades."' It is in this respect that the book serves as a worthy
starting point for a broader review of recent books relevant to public
land policy. Because Kemmis's book raises so many useful and provocative questions, it inspires the reader to review the literature for other
perspectives and answers.
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Fortunately, that literature includes a number of recent books
that add important ideas to the conversation. Like any good host then,
this essay will endeavor to get the discussion started by suggesting some
of the most promising connections and shared insights among these
authors. The dialogue begins with a critical review of Kemmis's case for
localism as advanced in This Sovereign Land. It then explores the basic
socioeconomic changes in the West that are central to his thesis through
the book Post-Cowboy Economics, by Thomas Power and Richard Barrett.
Next comes Democracy in Practice,a recent work by Thomas Beierle and
Jerry Cayford of Resources For the Future that both confirms and
challenges Kemmis's optimism about the benefits of direct public
participation in environmental policy making. On the other hand, Eric
Mogren's environmental history of the western uranium milling
industry, Warm Sands, reminds us of the continuing importance of
federal involvement in solving seemingly intractable environmental
problems. Finally, Karen Merrill's Public Lands and Political Meaning, a
thoughtful and detailed history of public lands ranching, adds an
important topic-property rights-that is otherwise surprisingly absent
from the conversation.
The dialogue among these authors both confirms some of
Kemmis' ideas and raises new questions as well. The West is undergoing
significant socioeconomic changes, and the trend towards greater public
participation in environmental policy seems promising. Kemmis's
eagerness to eliminate any role for federal governance over these lands
feels premature, however, and perhaps unduly pessimistic about the
prospects of a more equal mix of federal and local authority. More
significantly, his proposal gives relatively little attention to a key
relationship in any shift of authority over public lands-the connection
between property rights and claims of political sovereignty. Progressive
Era legal scholar Morris Cohen noted in the early twentieth century that
property rights could represent a form of private sovereignty by the
wealthy over the poor-a degree of personal control that rivaled the
most coercive authority of any government.2 Merrill's book extends
Cohen's idea to argue convincingly that ownership claims have
underwritten the conflicting legal and political arguments about public
lands sovereignty from Camfield v. U.S. to the present. 3 What Kemmis
risks suggesting, in light of these ideas, is a form of "sovereignty without
property"; that is, a proposal to expand local control over public lands
without clarifying or unraveling the many private and public claims of
ownership that demarcate them. Without a more direct consideration of
what role conflicting property claims and ideas will play in his system,
Kemmis's proposal remains thought-provoking but also incomplete.
But the conservation is running ahead of itself here; it is better to
explore the specifics of Kemmis's work in more detail before moving on
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to such abstruse conclusions. This Sovereign Land really makes both a
normative and a predictive argument about the future of public lands:
that westerners should take greater control over their own land base, and
that over time they will do just that. Most of the first part of the book is
dedicated to the latter proposition: that in the near future "the West will
figure out how to be in charge of the West." 4 Kemmis bases this
prediction on several trends. Westerners have never fully accepted the
sovereignty of the federal government over the public lands, he claims,
as attested by the perpetual cycle of rebellion and protest documented in
chapter three. From anti-Pinchotism and the "land grab" era to the
Sagebrush Rebellion and the Wise Use and County Rights movements,
westerners have resisted federal authority in a series of legal and
political battles that reveal how the issue of sovereignty "remains
unresolved in the minds of many" even today. 5 Furthermore, the federal
agencies responsible for the majority of the western public lands-the
Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)-are losing
public legitimacy (as well as funding) in the face of tighter budgets and
fierce interest group politics. At the same time, the forces of globalization
are rendering national boundaries increasingly irrelevant and making
political and economic organization based on natural borders and
connections (like watersheds or even continents in the case of trade
agreements like NAFTA) far more important.
In contrast to this weakening of federal power, Kemmis is quite
sanguine about the West's growing ability to govern itself. He describes
the thriving corpus of resident western intellectuals: poets, historians,
and others who are helping the region to develop its own distinctive
"voice" to support a growing sense of regional independence and
maturity. More specifically, his enthusiasm for new western efforts at
collaboration and resource management at a local or regional level
knows no bounds. In chapter six, he describes in great detail the
apparent success of these new "coalitions of the unalike": partnerships of
farmers, environmentalists,
like ranchers,
former adversaries
recreationists, timber companies, and so forth working together to craft
mutually agreeable policies for a given ecological zone.
Central to Kemmis's argument is the belief that these groups do
best "by working together outside the established, centralized
government framework." 6 This is bad news for the federal land
management agencies, he argues, since they view collaboration as a
promising ticket out of the bruising interest-group politics currently
running them into the ground. While Kemmis professes to be amenable
to federal agencies working closely with collaboration groups, he is
clearly skeptical of the BLM or Forest Service having a viable place at the
table in the long term. In the end, he concludes, the key to any
collaborative effort is ultimate authority, or sovereignty. No one will
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want to do the hard work of collaboration only to have federal
bureaucrats overturn or ignore their decisions. And this conflict over
sovereignty, between federal agencies and local collaborators, looks like
a struggle between opposing "quantum principles" that cannot be
reconciled. 7 Drawing a comparison to the nineteenth century tensions
over slavery, Kemmis concludes that the current conflict may be equally
8
"irrepressible."
The alternative presented here, however, is not one of the usual
suspects: devolution to the states, say, or the privatization of public lands
favored by the PERC-set. Instead, Kemmis turns to John Wesley Powell's
nineteenth century vision of watershed councils as the inspiration for his
proposal. Emulating both Powell's historical ideas and modem
collaboration efforts, Kemmis envisions major stakeholders in a
watershed mutually working out their collective goals and plans for the
local ecosystem over a number of years. Finally, when their plans are
complete, this "compact" of stakeholders would form an "interstate
management group" to take control over all the Forest Service and BLM
lands in the region. With congressional approval, and a guarantee of
continued public ownership in perpetuity, this compact of local
stakeholders would directly manage the relevant public lands for the
goal of "sustainable ecosystem health." The Feds would no longer have a
role, and no state government would be running the show eitherinstead, the regional council itself would be directly in charge.
The scope and complexity of such a proposal is breathtaking,
and Kemmis does not offer many details on how these regional councils
would function. This invites immediate criticism from the naysayers, as
he freely admits. Simply deciding who would get a seat at the regional
council table (And for how long? Based on what appointment process?
Using what decision rules within the council itself?) could be an
intractable
obstacle
to
implementation.
Complaints
about
unrepresentative membership and undemocratic procedures are a
common refrain already among environmentalists and other critics of
high-profile collaboration efforts like the Quincy Library Group. 9 They
seem likely to intensify under a plan like Kemmis's that gives locals a
degree of authority Tom Nelson and Mike Jackson could only dream
about.
Nor does Kemmis offer much concrete evidence that the
watershed movement has been a smashing success to date-in his own
words, there remains a "relative lack of documentation" of the eventual
outcomes of these collaborative initiatives. '° This makes it harder to
support a more radical proposal like his on faith. Indeed, in the absence
of clear evidence of success his arguments seem to overreach at times,
ignoring well-known potential pitfalls of local control like a lack of
adequate resources or expertise to handle complex management issues,
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or economic pressure resulting in a "race to the bottom" among local
environmental standards. More fundamentally, Kemmis never fully
explains why he believes that proximity qualifies a person to be a more
effective manager of natural resources, all other things being equal. Nor,
finally, is it clear why sovereignty over these lands is such a black-andwhite issue for Kemmis, who states at one point that one cannot be "a
little bit sovereign." This seems too simple; surely there are examples of
shared sovereignty over land-where national and state or local forces
are indeed each "a bit sovereign"-that are also promising models of
governance for the West."1
But as noted above, the importance of This Sovereign Land is not
so much in the details of its proposal as in the issues it raises. Making us
think about the appropriate definition of democracy in the public lands
context, about what the collaboration movement might ultimately look
like, or even about the historical contingency of federal control over
public lands in the first place, is an extremely useful accomplishment.
The questions Kemmis asks are intriguing and important, even if his
own answers remain necessarily speculative and still in progress. The
book is well written, with a style that is easy to read but not overly
simplistic. At several points it provides valuable historical perspectives
on modem policy conflicts, including a fascinating discussion of the
similarities and differences between Thomas Jefferson and Theodore
Roosevelt as builders of the American "empire." In short, it is a worthy
rumination on public lands policy: past, present and future.
One of the central themes of This Sovereign Land is the changing
nature of western society and politics. At several points, the book
touches on the economy of the "New West," in which traditional natural
resource extraction industries have a diminished role and forces of
globalization are increasingly influential. This economic transition is
discussed in greater detail by University of Montana economists Thomas
Michael Power and Richard N. Barrett. Their book, Post-Cowboy
Economics: Pay and Prosperity in the New American West, welcomes the
new western economy and argues against those who think the West is
losing ground. In fact, they argue, the West has moved from a "cowboy"
economy based on resources extraction to a stronger "post-cowboy"
order relying more on service industries and environmental amenities.
While some mistakenly bemoan this shift as evidence of a "region in
decline," Power and Barrett urge the opposite view-the new western
economy is healthier than the cowboy economy before it, and those
seeking to revive the region's traditional resource extraction industries
are making a terrible mistake.
Post-Cowboy Economics starts with a few uncontested facts that
seem to indicate a faltering western economy. Wages in the West are
lower than in the rest of the nation, on average, and the gap has been
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getting worse, not better, in the past two decades. Meanwhile, natural
resource industries represent a declining percentage of the region's job
base, while service industry positions are growing rapidly. These
statistics have created fear of a "servant economy" developing in the
West, where former lumberjacks and miners now clean hotel rooms and
work at Wal-Mart for $6/hour. Believers in this trend may then argue for
policies attempting to revitalize natural resource industries, including
doing away with numerous environmental regulations in the hopes of
stimulating new mining, timber, or grazing initiatives.
Despite its popularity, Power and Barrett reject this
interpretation of what is happening in the western economy. Using a
wide range of data on regional wages and employment, they conclude
that while wages per job are down in the West, income per person is
actually higher (due to more people entering the workforce or holding
more than one job). While many decry the rise of part-time work as a
further blow to western workers, they cite statistics that indicate 90
percent of those working part time do so voluntarily. Nor are we seeing
a new "servant economy"-while the service sector is growing, jobs in
the retail sector (those dreaded Wal-Mart positions) are flat as a
percentage of total jobs. Instead, they argue, wages in the west are lower
for two far more innocent reasons: a lower cost of living, and the greater
environmental amenities of living in the area. Western workers, in other
words, draw what the authors call a "second paycheck" in the form of
cheaper prices, cleaner air, less congestion, and beautiful scenery that
makes up for their relatively lower cash wages.12
Power and Barrett also focus on larger economic forces as a key
reason for a drop in western wages in the last two decades. Their claim is
that national economic forces and trends are very hard to escape locally,
since labor moves relatively freely around the nation. Thus, national
trends like declining wages for less-educated workers, a declining real
minimum wage, and a reduction in the number of unionized jobs are
largely responsible for the drop in real wages in the West, rather than
any local trend away from natural resource industries. 3 In this respect,
they are in close agreement with Kemmis regarding the importance of
larger economic forces on the West's political economic situation
(although clearly they disagree over how much national economic
policies still matter). Furthermore, Power and Barrett conclude that
western policy makers would err terribly in easing environmental
protections, since the amenities of a cleaner environment are a key part
of the "second paycheck" driving Western economic growth. Kemmis
echoes this point, arguing that in a globalizing world, the relatively
pristine nature of the western environment is a key comparative
that should be protected and exploited, rather
advantage for the region
14
away.
frittered
than

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

In reaching these conclusions, Post-Cowboy Economics makes a
convincing argument against the blind pursuit of more resource
extraction employment, and for the idea that national economic trends
are primarily responsible for the regional decline in wages. It brings a
refreshing dose of evidence and data to a controversy that is frequently
discussed in terms of anecdotes and conventional wisdom. It is clearly
presented and documented for both economists and non-economists
alike and is highly relevant to public lands scholars in terms of clarifying
the modem economic outlook for the American West.
Beyond these solid achievements, however, the book may be a
little unsatisfying for those with an interest in the process of
globalization. Unlike Kemmis, the authors seem relatively unconcerned
with the larger impacts of globalization on the region. They do not
discuss why unions are atrophying and wages are falling in the United
States in general, or what that larger trend means for the West in the
long term. While they dismiss the fear of an economy in regionaldecline,
in fact their data show that life is getting more difficult for the average
American worker in the age of open markets and global competition. The
fact that these trends are national and not regional is important, but it
does not moot the fear and anger expressed in western protests like the
Jarbidge shovel brigade (wherein westerners sent more than 10,000
shovels to Jarbidge, Nevada, to help "reopen" a recently-closed Forest
Service road, and more generally to protest the decline of natural
resource industry jobs in the region). A loss of high-paying, natural
resource jobs for less-educated workers may not be due to local
environmental regulations, in other words, but the kinds of jobs
available to people like those protesting at Jarbidge have changed,
generally for the worse.
Kemmis, by contrast, seems more interested in the regional
impact of the larger forces of global economic competition, and how the
West must respond to them. He also discusses the Jarbidge protest (and
others like it), but with a somewhat different interpretation. No
sagebrush rebel, Kemmis calls such protests against federal and
international institutions "increasingly pathetic" and ultimately
ineffectual. 5 Unlike Power and Barrett, however, Kemmis has a deeper
sympathy for the basic worries of these protesters regarding the forces of
global competition. Rather than saying that such protesters are simply
misguided in their views, Kemmis seems to conclude that they are
essentially correct in their fear of certain structural shifts in their
economy, but mistaken in their prescribed cure. Burning UN flags and
forcibly reopening Forest Service roads will not help their cause, in other
words, but taking stronger control of the region's own political destiny
just might.
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Finally, while Power and Barrett's empirical conclusions are
illuminating and insightful, their policy recommendations are less
edifying. If Kemmis's policy prescriptions seem too sweeping, Power
and Barrett's may be too cautious. Their overriding conclusion is that
there is little local policy makers can do to address pockets of economic
decline in the West. While they are quite clear that rolling back
environmental regulations would be counter-productive, otherwise they
conclude that "modesty is a virtue" in local policy making.1 6 Given the
dominant influence of larger national/global trends, there is relatively
little Western communities can do to influence their economic future.
While refreshingly humble, this advice may seem too fatalistic for those
who are hurting in the new western economy. Another recommendation
that leaves the reader thirsting for more is that governments should
"define the public interest carefully." 17 While hard to argue with, this
conclusion may not give policy makers much traction without a little
more guidance toward achieving such an elusive goal. In this respect,
Kemmis's ideas could be seen as taking up where the economists leave
off, offering a more concrete (if still partial and controversial) vision of
how to define and pursue the public interest of the region most
appropriately.
Two authors who directly tackle the problem of defining the
"public interest" through participatory democracy are Thomas C. Beierle
and Jerry Cayford of Resources for the Future (RFF). In their book Democracy in Practice: Public Participationin Environmental Decisions, Beierle
and Cayford explicitly define a successful effort to increase public participation in environmental decisions as having five qualities:
(1) It incorporates public values into decision,
(2) it improves the substantive quality of the decision,
(3) it resolves conflict among competing interests,
(4) it builds trust in the relevant public institutions; and,
(5) it educates and informs the public.
Using these five goals as their criteria, the RFF scholars evaluate
the success or failure of more than 200 existing case studies of public
participation in environmental policy. The result is a careful, quantitative
analysis of a large set of qualitative data coded by the authors into more
than 100 variables regarding the context, process, and outcomes of each
case. Overall, their findings are quite promising for public participation
initiatives: more than 60 percent of the cases studied score "high" on an
overall variable summing up performance on the five criteria above and
are declared by the authors as "an overall success."
Using multivariate regression, Beierle and Cayford also isolate
key predictors of positive outcomes. What emerges from this second
level of analysis is that success depends greatly on changes in process
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but not in context. The type of environmental issue under consideration,
for example, and the scope of the problem (narrow or broad) are not
important to predicting success.1 8 The type of process, however, is
crucial. In general, the more "intensive" the participation process, the
greater chance of success. Thus, public hearings are least likely to meet
the five criteria, while advisory committees perform better and directly
negotiated regulations do better still. In addition, the responsiveness of
the lead agency, the motivation of the participants, and the "quality of
the deliberations" are other process factors that make success more likely
as well.' 9
These findings are deeply relevant to Kemmis's agenda, and
indeed to scholars of public participation and localism in general. Here is
a more comprehensive validation of the participatory approach to
policy-making missing from This Sovereign Land. In this way, Democracy
in Practice clearly bolsters Kemmis's enthusiasm for watershed
collaborations as an improved form of democratic governance. Beierle
and Cayford are optimistic about public participation and insist that
such efforts should be expanded in environmental policy. But they also
share Kemmis's concern that administrators ultimately will be unable to
embrace this new perspective, noting that public participation has
gained only a "grudging acceptance" to date. This worry is especially
relevant in the public lands context, since their findings identify federal
agencies as being more likely to fail at collaborative management
projects than their state and local brethren.2 ° In the end, the authors urge
a more radical change that resonates with the arguments advanced in
This Sovereign Land. "Rather than seeing policy decisions as
fundamentally technical with some need for public input," they
conclude, "we should see many more decisions as fundamentally public
with the need for some technical input."2'
That said, supporters of localism should refrain from breaking
out the champagne and declaring intellectual victory just yet. Despite its
optimism, Democracy in Practiceoffers a number of caveats. Of particular
importance is the finding that for many cases the exclusion or absence of
a key interest group was critical to the effort's overall success. In terms of
the goal "resolving conflicts among interests," for example, one-third of
the cases measured on this variable omitted a key issue or party in order
to ease tensions and aid agreement.22 This is a major qualification to the
overall rate of success. As the authors note, collaborations that lack a key
interest group or issue may find their recommendations harder to
23
implement politically once the internal discussions are complete.
Similarly, many groups in the study were quite small, and their
successes in terms of building trust and educating the public did not
extend to the larger polity. Thus, the book's rather glowing endorsement
of participatory decision making contains a rather important
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qualification: the process generally works for those invited, but in many
cases not everyone important is in attendance or even on the guest list.
Whether watershed councils or other forms of local governance would
work so well if forced to include all key interests, or to consider all key
issues (as Kemmis's proposed councils would have to do), is much less
clear.
Finally, the RFF authors also make an observation about bottomup versus top-down collaboration that seems to counter one of the main
points of This Sovereign Land. Recall that Kernmis favors the watershed
council approach in large part because it is "bottom up"-initiated and
directed by locals rather than federal agencies. This "organic" nature of
these groups, he claims, is a key part of their success. Perhaps
surprisingly, Beierle and Cayford find that the "organic" nature of the
24
cases they studied did not matter much in terms of outcomes. In other
words, efforts initiated and controlled by the lead agency fared as well as
those organized independently from the ground up. This result seems to
reject both conventional wisdom and Kemmis's explicit belief that local
initiative and control are essential to the success of localism efforts. It is
important not to overstate the disagreement here; Beierle and Cayford
later conclude that agencies must give "adequate" authority to the public
5
in order for any such participatory process to be successful. But it does
not seem evident that these efforts must originate at the grassroots, nor
that the abdication of power by the lead agency must be as complete as
Kemmis is inclined to think.
Indeed, the discussion of implementation in chapter six of
Democracy in Practiceadds even more complexity to the top-down versus
bottom-up question. Here Beierle and Cayford note that enhanced public
participation does not itself predict a greater chance of successful policy
implementation. This is clearly a major obstacle for collaboration efforts;
if their decisions remain unlikely to be put into action, their efforts risk
being wasted. The key to successful policy implementation is, of course,
solid support and backing by those with political authority-politicians
and agency administrators. So one priority for a successful participatory
process is to get strong political backing from the start. This seems
eminently reasonable advice, but it weakens the case for a local decisionmaking process conducted largely apart from the relevant government
agencies. Organic, bottom-up procedures may be preferable in some
ways, but if they risk greater ineffectiveness at the implementation stage
then it is less clear on what basis one would ultimately recommend
them. Kemmis, of course, solves this problem by transferring political
authority from the relevant agencies directly to the watershed councils.
But this, as was discussed above, seems a long-shot proposition for the
near term at least. In the meantime, those favoring greater local control
over policy might look more closely at systems of "mixed" sovereignty
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that retain the backing and involvement of the relevant state and federal
powers in order to enhance their chances of seeing change occur on the
ground.2 6
Historian Eric W. Mogren also explores the tension between
local and national control over environmental policy, but in an entirely
different context. Warm Sands is Mogren's history of federal policy
regarding the issue of uranium mill tailings in the western United States.
The book describes the full arc of the uranium mining industry, from
early twentieth century efforts to extract radium to the boom and
eventual bust of the domestic uranium industry from the 1950s to the
1980s. In particular, the book focuses on the public health threat posed
by one aspect of uranium mining: the massive piles of low-level
radioactive tailings left behind by the process of milling raw uranium ore
into a more concentrated form of "yellowcake" used by reactors around
the nation. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) plays a key role in the
story for its failure to address the mill tailings problem throughout the
1950s and '60s. Eventually, in the wake of a media-fed crisis over the use
of radioactive tailings as building material for thousands of homes and
buildings in Grand Junction, Colorado (leading to its unfortunate
nickname, "America's most radioactive city"), Congress became directly
involved with the problem. In 1978, the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act (UMTRCA) started a massive federal clean up of the
problem, bringing the history to a close twenty years later when the last
of the piles was contained.
Warm Sands tells an engaging and interesting story that includes
several common themes from the literature on public lands. Mogren's
description of the rise and fall of the uranium mining industry is
fascinating (especially the "boom" in the 1950s when Geiger counters
flew off the shelves of Sears and Montgomery Ward and seemingly
everyone was prospecting for radioactive ore).27 The eventual decline of
the uranium industry is also, of course, a case-in-point of the "postcowboy economics" that have become the norm in the western U.S. And
in its criticisms of the AEC, the book echoes the frustrations of Kemmis
and many other scholars with federal agencies that fail to regulate
effectively in the public interest. The story of the AEC's conflict with the
public over uranium tailings management is much the same, in this
sense, as that of the Forest Service and clear cutting or of the Bureau of
Land Management and overgrazing, among many other well-known
controversies. 28 In other words, the book is a lesser-known example of a
well-known problem-agency
stonewalling and reluctance to
acknowledge new problems or concerns expressed by the public.
But if Mogren's criticisms are similar to Kemmis's, his
conclusions are startlingly different. The only proper answer in the
uranium mill tailings debacle, he argues, was strong federal authority
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and control. Indeed, Mogren criticizes the Feds for failing to take
responsibility for the issue sooner, and says that only federal money and
expertise could adequately solve what was, at heart, a national problem
29
created by national demand for atomic fuel. Although certain states
tried to remedy the tailings problem with limited success, in the end only
coordinated federal action in the guise of UMTRCA was able to end the
dispute. Thus Warm Sands raises a sharp challenge to the advocates of
localism everywhere even as it joins in their chorus of complaints. In the
end, the book argues, it takes the massive resources of the federal
government to solve the biggest environmental problems we face on the
public lands and elsewhere.
Of course Mogren's argument for federal involvement is not
directed specifically at localism advocates like Kemmis. His main target
is federal bureaucracies like the Atomic Energy Commission and their
expert managers. Nor is his argument completely airtight in its own
conclusions. For example, Mogren asserts that a federal clean-up effort is
justified in part because no one could reasonably blame local
governments like Grand Junction for permitting the use of uranium
tailings as building fill out of ignorance. Yet in a subsequent chapter, he
describes how Salt Lake City rejected a similar request to use tailings as
construction material, based on explicit (and ultimately accurate) health
concerns. 30 Given what seems like a very reasonable level of caution
expressed by other western governments, one might at least ask why
Grand Junction or the state of Colorado could not be held more
responsible for their own risky choices. Frustratingly for the localism
advocate, this is a question Mogren does not consider in his assertion of
federal responsibility. Nevertheless, despite minor concerns like this
Warm Sands offer a useful perspective on the localism question, if only to
force us to remember that while the federal government has created
more than its share of environmental messes, it is also the main source of
funding and expertise for cleaning them up. Those supporting local
authority must recognize that it may seem far less appealing when, as in
the case of Grand Junction, local communities may be left holding the
bag.
Few episodes in public lands history are more evocative of the
conflict between federal and local control than the struggle over grazing
policy. Unfortunately, the importance of this story has been obscured by
oversimplifications of greedy cattle barons and captured federal
agencies. 3' A new book by Williams College history professor Karen
Merrill, however, helps to rectify this situation and make the grazing
case more directly relevant to debates over public land sovereignty. In
Public Lands and Political Meaning, Merrill brings a refreshing new
perspective to the story of public lands grazing policy: a focus on the key
role of property rights. Starting with the initial efforts to regulate grazing
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in the Forest Reserves, her book traces the history of conflict between
public lands ranchers and agencies through the New Deal and the
McCarran era of the 1940s, concluding with the post WWII "land grab"
controversy that so exercised Bernard De Voto. Relying substantially on
livestock association records, as well as other primary and secondary
sources, Merrill weaves a compelling and theoretically sophisticated
narrative. Even more importantly, she correctly emphasizes the key role
played by dueling ideas of property and ownership during the struggle.
The history of public lands grazing is so deeply grounded in
conflicts between local and national sovereignty that it could hardly be
more relevant to Kemmis's agenda. And indeed, Merrill's book holds
several implications for modem advocates of devolution and localism.
For one thing, it raises the vital distinction between private and local
interests. Traditionally, one school of thought regarding localism has
been that it is simply a "fig leaf" for control of the public agenda by
narrow private interest groups. 32 This argument has tended to cite
federal grazing policy as the leading example of "agency capture" by
private groups (the livestock industry) under the guise of local control.
And similarly, skeptics of modem devolution proposals argue that
control by private, special interests is either the real agenda, or at least
the likely outcome.3 3 Setting aside the empirical question of whether
public lands grazing is actually a meaningful example of agency capture
(a question over which Merrill seems to hesitate), Public Lands and
Political Meaning does emphasize the crucial point that local (or state)
and private (or individual) control are not the same thing and often
coexist in an uneasy relationship. 34 Local sovereignty, in other words, is
not the same as private sovereignty. In fact, ranchers in Merrill's history
rarely speak with one voice over whether they want private ownership,
devolution to the states, or continued federal authority over the public
grazing lands. Given this historical pattern, one has to wonder whether
they will be any more clear regarding a proposal like Kemmis's.
More importantly, Merrill's book expresses how central property
rights and ownership claims are to any understanding of public lands
politics. Specifically, she draws on Morris Cohen's connection between
property and sovereignty in explaining the conflict. Cohen, as noted at
the outset of this essay, made the important argument that ownership of
private property can lead to a degree of control over the choices of others
that would rival the power of many governments. In this respect, the
private right of property can lead to a very public power of sovereignty
over one's fellow citizens. In an innovative extension of this idea, Merrill
applies Cohen's argument to the issue of sovereignty on public lands. She
notes that private ranchers based their claims of authority or sovereignty
over the public range in large part on their assertions of private
ownership. Similarly, and more surprisingly, the federal government
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responded by grounding their own arguments in favor of national
sovereignty on the basis of federal ownership of the land, rather than on
some other compelling notion of the public interest. Thus, in the
controversy over public lands grazing, both sides used ownership of the
land as the fundamental basis for their claims of sovereignty. While
Cohen's argument originally applied to a sort of implicit power of
sovereignty based on ownership, Merrill shows how the actors in this
struggle used property as an explicit basis for authority and control over
land.
Indeed, there is a lovely discussion in Public Lands and Political
Meaning of land ownership as a prerequisite to "manhood," or the full
expression of control over one's destiny. Thus, much as Jefferson sought
a nation of land-owning farmers who would resist public tyranny
through self-sufficiency, western states in the 1920s and later compared
themselves to "grown men" who were able and entitled to own all the
35
land within their borders. This is remarkably evocative of Kemmis's
claim eighty years later that the West has "matured" as a region to the
point where it is "ready" to assume full responsibility and control over
all the lands within its borders. Ownership, it seems, is not only a path to
sovereignty but also a symbol of maturity and full membership in
society for states and for regions as well as for individuals.
The strong connection between property and sovereignty raises
more questions for participants in the dialogue over public lands policy.
Beierle and Cayford, for example, speculate about missing variables that
would make "context" a more important predictor of participatory
policy outcomes.36 Perhaps the varieties of private property
arrangements in each case could be just such a variable? Kemmis,
meanwhile, might consider atter reading Merrill's book how his
watershed councils will deal with the multiple (and conflicting) private
ownership claims that demarcate the public lands at present. Indeed,
some would argue (including the present author) that much of the
federal estate is so shot through with private claims as to be more
accurately described as only "nominally" retained in federal ownership
at all.37 Merrill makes what seems like a related point at the end of her
book, observing that "the hardness of the property divide between
ranchers and the federal government has also made it difficult to forge
38
new management techniques that could stand outside this model." In
other words, until we untie (or at least honestly recognize) the Gordian
knot of conflicting ownership claims on the public domain, we may have
great difficulty moving the policy debate forward toward devolution or
any other option. Watershed councils may have an easier time wrestling
with these private claims than the federal government has, of course, but
why this would be more than wishful thinking on the part of localism
advocates remains unsaid.
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All of this is not to say that the provocative and praiseworthy
discussion of property and sovereignty in Public Lands and Political
Meaning lacks any difficulties of its own. Although the book is quite
sophisticated in its discussion of property theory in general, it offers little
discussion of certain key authors. Given how central John Locke's ideas
have been to American public land policy in general, and the ownership
claims of public lands ranchers in particular, it might have been helpful
to see his theory play a more prominent role in the discussion. In
addition, and more trivially, the book uses the term "rights" frequently,
without always being entirely clear whether this is just shorthand for
property rights or some other distinct concept not fully defined. Given
the proliferation of "rights talk" in U.S. politics, careful specification of
the word in a given context is extremely helpful.
More importantly, the book sometimes seems to overstate the
important relationship between property and sovereignty, or ownership
and control as one might also phrase it. A key strategy in public lands
management has always been the pursuit of effective control without the
burdens of actual ownership. While Merrill is quite cognizant of this fact,
at times she seems reluctant to accept that ranchers might have been
seeking such an outcome. She is especially puzzled, for instance, as to
why public lands ranchers were so vociferous in their demands for
privatizing the public lands in the 1940s, when their deal with the federal
government at the time was on such good terms. Yet a logical
explanation seems to be that ranchers figured the best defense is a good
offense-that the best way to maintain effective control without actual
ownership of the public domain was to continue banging the drum of
privatization, eventually backing off in favor of lower fees and weaker
administrative oversight. And indeed, this seems to be exactly what
happened with the demise of the Grazing Service and the birth of the
BLM in the late 1940s.
Despite these minor criticisms, however, Merrill's book
represents a worthy addition to the literature on public lands and is
arguably the most important history of public domain grazing since E.
Louise Peffer's work. In addition, it should inspire devolution advocates
to tease apart local and private interests carefully, while paying close
attention to the ongoing dialogue and conflict over private property
rights in environmental policy. It is most interesting, for example, that
Kemmis requires the federal lands managed by his new watershed
councils to remain in public ownership "in perpetuity." Unfortunately,
he says little more about why he includes this requirement, or what link
it has to his vision of local sovereignty. While its practical intent may be
simply to reduce fears of local control turning into domination by private
interests, the idea actually opens a Pandora's box of perplexing issues
regarding ownership and control. Will a watershed council, in the end,

Winter 2003]

BOOK REVIEWS

have any more luck with controversies over private grazing permits than
the BLM? Regardless of the answer, one thing seems certain: any attempt
to assert a new form of sovereignty over the public lands without
addressing the connection to property rights head-on is likely to fail.
"Sovereignty without property," as it were, seems an unlikely outcome
in the public lands context.
In conclusion, then, I fear that Kemmis's book may suffer the
unkind fate of many thoughtful books-by raising more questions than
it can possibly answer, it risks being dismissed. Yet that would be truly
unfortunate, given the conversation he has helped structure in this essay.
The West is clearly changing, as Kemmis describes, and increased local
control is a promising new political force that is a big part of those
changes. Yet those who predict the demise of federal involvement in
public lands policy may speak too soon. It is not clear, in the end, that
the elimination of a federal role in governing these lands is either
inevitable or desirable. Rather, a mixed form of sovereignty, recognizing
the valid claims of private individuals, local communities, and national
constituencies may be the preferred path. While designing such a mixed
system poses as many or more challenges as the devolved authority
suggested by Kemmis, in the end it may still be the best option on the
table. To do otherwise is potentially to ignore the fragmented and
complex nature of both ownership and control over the public lands
today, to the ultimate detriment of everyone involved.
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